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ESSAYS
WEBER'S "POLITICS AS A VOCATION": SOME
AMERICAN CONSIDERATIONS
ALAN MIrrLEMA*
In "Politics as a Vocation," a lecture delivered at the Univer-
sity of Munich in January 1919, Max Weber argued for a morality
requisite to politics. He explored the idea of politics as a voca-
tion or calling (Beruj) and inquired into what are the ethical con-
sequences of such a calling.
In this essay, I reflect on whether Weber's political morality
has relevance to our American circumstances. Should we be
guided in our public life by what Weber called the ethic of
responsibility (Verantwortungsethik), as opposed to its permanent
alternative, the ethic of absolute ends (Gesinnungsethik)? On its
face, the answer appears obvious. Who would not prefer, for
public life, a sober, prudential ethic-one that weighs ends and
means or balances intentions and consequences-over a purist
moralism? The one is about compromise and adjustment. The
other is about sanctification or salvation. Surely the latter has
limited applicability to a democratic politics. This facile
response, however, ignores at least two important considerations.
First, change in American political life often has been driven
by eruptive purist moralism. Such crusades as abolitionism, tem-
perance, women's suffrage, the civil rights movement, opposition
to various wars, indeed, the Revolution itself drew their energy
from morally uncompromising zealotry stoked by religious con-
viction. The ongoing, heavy engagement of religious persons
and groups in American political life seems a standing offense to
Weber's concept of political morality, at least at first blush.
Although religion-rich politics in America constitutes, in Weber-
ian terms, the routinization of charisma (consider the Christian
Coalition today compared with fifteen years ago when it was led
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by the charismatic Ralph Reed), there is plenty of non-routinized
charisma at work as well.' Presidential elections, especially close
ones, sometimes turn on the indefinable, charismatic attributes
(or the deficit thereof) of the candidates. Weber did not exempt
the United States from his dark predictions of an increasingly
"disenchanted" secular modernity, but in this he seems mistaken.
Part of American exceptionalism vis-d-vis Europe is surely its
selective resistance to secularization, displayed in the religious
moralism of its politics. "Values voters," who vote against their
"rational" interests, confound somewhat the Weberian assump-
tion of inexorable secularization.2 As difficult as it is for politics
to accommodate fervent religion, it is part of the American tradi-
tion and has arguably, to take a non-Weberian stance, contrib-
uted much good over the centuries. Biblical religion is one of
the "two wings," in Michael Novak's felicitous phrase, on which
the American eagle takes flight.' Can the continuing salience of
Judeo-Christian religiosity in our politics square with Weberian
political morality?
Second, Weber's ethic has come in for tremendous criticism
from the cultural Right as fundamentally antithetical to
America's founding principles. In Leo Strauss's Natural Right and
History and in his disciple Allan Bloom's The Closing of the Ameri-
can Mind, Weber is the needle through which Nietzschean toxins
enter the American bloodstream. Strauss and Bloom believe that
America rises or falls on the basis of the idea of natural right-
that there is a truly just way of life capable of being known by
natural reason and lived out in political society-and that Weber
dooms and damns all of this through value-freedom. Weber, as
these critics see him, tears the foundations out from under ethics
and makes ethics depend on irrational acts of will.4 No one way
1. There is literature on the disenchanting effects of political engage-
ment by former Moral Majority insiders. See, e.g., ED DOBSON & ED HINDSON,
THE SEDUCTION OF POWER (1988); CAL THOMAS & ED DOBSON, BLINDED BY
MIGHT (1999).
2. For a lively argument on how an orientation toward social values alleg-
edly undercuts rational, economic interests, see THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE
MATTER WITH KANSAS?: How CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA
(2004).
3. MICHAEL NOVAK, ON Two WINGS: HUMBLE FAITH AND COMMON SENSE
AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 27 (2002).
4. A representative citation from Strauss:
The thought of the present age is characterized by disenchantment or
unqualified 'this-worldliness,' or irreligion. What claims to be free-
dom from delusions is as much and as little delusion as the faiths
which prevailed in the past and which may prevail in the future. We
are irreligious because fate forces us to be irreligious and for no other
reason .... [Weber] was certain that all devotion to causes or ideals
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of moral thought or moral life is better than any other. Human-
ity is condemned to an incessant battle of gods and demons. The
best that one can do is stare into the abyss and act with dignity
and probity. This is the only upright response to the ontological
reality of nihilism. But when upright men such as Weber-the
ones who still draw guidance, if only out of custom and habit,
from traditions of religious morality-depart from the scene, it is
all reductio ad Hitlerum, a war of all against all.
There is truth in such criticism. But it is also true that
Weber did not understand himself as a relativist or a nihilist. His
vaunted "value freedom" (Wertfreiheit) in scientific work was less a
philosophical judgment about the human condition than a
methodological rule for the conduct of inquiry.5 And where it
did function as a philosophical judgment about the human con-
dition, it was meant to guarantee the dignity of scientific inquiry
or of historical-political action by heroic personalities, free of the
constraints of deference to traditional authority, bureaucratic
limitation or inner fragmentation. Weber believed in an ideal of
human excellence, shaped by the "inner worldly asceticism" of
his Reformed Protestant past.6 Weber represents, for a self-con-
sciously secular age, the moral intensity and austerity of Ameri-
has its roots in religious faith and, therefore, that the decline of relig-
ious faith will ultimately lead to the extinction of all causes or ideals.
He tended to see before him the alternative of either complete spiri-
tual emptiness or religious revival. He despaired of the modern this-
worldly irreligious experiment, and yet he remained attached to it
because he was fated to believe in science as he understood it. The
result of this conflict, which he could not resolve, was his belief that the
conflict between values cannot be resolved by human reason.
LEO STRAuss, NATURAL RIGHT AND HIsToRY 73-74 (1953) (emphasis added).
Strauss here objects to a) the notion that reason is largely subject to fate, that is,
reason is in thrall to the irrational, and b) that reason cannot resolve conflicts
of values, that is, reason cannot, by nature, decide which way of life is naturally
right.
For Bloom's treatment of Weber, which is much more harsh and much less
subtle than Strauss', see ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND
150 (1987). Also to be considered are the natural right arguments of the great
scholar of Lincoln's political thought, Harry jaffa. Although Jaffa does not refer
to Weber by name, his polemic against "value-free" appraisals of Lincoln
implies disapproval of the Weberian project. See, e.g., HARRY V. JAFFA, A NEW
BIRTH OF FREEDOM: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR
75-77 (2000).
5. In a previous article, I defend Weber in some detail against Strauss'
criticisms. See Alan Mittleman, Leo Strauss and Relativism: The Critique of Max
Weber, 29 RELIGION 15 (1999).
6. This reading of Weber follows the persuasive interpretation in the
fourth chapter of HARRY LIEBERSOHN, FATE AND UTOPIA IN GERMAN SOCIOLOGY
1870-1923 (1988).
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can Puritanism.7 So, against critics such as Strauss or Bloom,
their insights into the incompatibility of Weber and natural right
notwithstanding, I would argue that Weber's political morality,
rightly understood, is highly germane to American circumstances
and is fully compatible with American tradition. As evidence for
this, I will analyze Abraham Lincoln's response to slavery in the
1850s as exemplary of a political "ethic of responsibility" in con-
trast to the abolitionists' "ethic of absolute ends." Far from a cor-
rosive intruder into American culture, Weber helpfully describes
the framework within which principled actors make political
decisions, without prejudice to their principles.
At the heart of Weber's essay, "Politics as a Vocation,"8 is the
concept of vocation or calling (Beru/). Weber used the term in
two senses-the idea of profession, in the quite ordinary sense of
career, and "calling" in the more elevated sense of chosen
response to one's destiny, or to a divine commission. The
English word "vocation" has the same connotations as Weber's
Beruf There are two types of politicians: professional politi-
cians-those with, in both senses of the term, a calling (Berufspoli-
tiker)-and occasional, non-professional politicians
(Gelegenheitspolitiker)-as for example appointees to honorary
offices. Weber's essay is devoted to analyzing the emergence and
sociological categorization of politicians by vocation, in the
course of which he explored the rise of the modern state, with-
out which politics as a demographically significant profession is
not possible. His essay proceeds by careful distinctions between,
inter alia, the state and sub-political organizations, politics, and
administration, and, most germane to our purposes, "living off'
and "living for" politics. Professional politicians live either from
politics-that is, they make their living off politics (von der Poli-
tik)-or they live for the sake of politics (ffir die Politik). To live
for politics is to grant political life high moral purpose and
meaning. Living for politics represents vocation or calling in the
second, more elevated sense of the term. I shall focus on this
sense of politics as moral and spiritual purpose.
Weber developed his concept of calling earlier in his justly
famous The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.9 There he
argues that the concept of a calling, although anticipated by early
7. Id.
8. MAX WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCI-
OLOGY 78-79 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946) [hereinafter
FROM MAX WEBER]. All citations of German terms are from Politik als Beruf in
MAX WEBER, GESAMMELTE POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN 493-548 (1958).
9. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 80
(Talcott Parsons trans., Scribner's 1958).
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Jewish literature and medieval German mysticism, emerges in a
substantial way only during the Reformation and only among
Protestants. Luther set the stage for the more consequential
development of the concept (consequential, that is, for the flour-
ishing of capitalism) in Calvinism. For Luther, who rejected the
otherworldliness and asceticism of monasticism, "the valuation of
the fulfillment of duty in worldly affairs [was] the highest form
which the moral activity of the individual could assume."' °
Monastic contemplativeness has a negative value: renunciation of
the duties of this world is the product of selfishness, as is with-
drawing from temporal obligations. One detects here an antici-
pation of the criticism that Weber reserves for the
Gesinnungsethiker, the moral absolutist who holds to spiritual
purity over worldly responsibility, in Politics as a Vocation. In
Luther's view, "the fulfillment of worldly duties is under all cir-
cumstances the only way to live acceptably to God.""
What does this actually mean? Weber sees Luther's concep-
tion of the calling as traditionalistic; that is, it defers to past
norms and orders. Traditionalism, in Weber's conceptual vocab-
ulary, is a form of authority opposed to charisma. The former
provides cultural replication and stasis, the latter upheaval and
change.' 2 "The individual should remain once and for all in the
station and calling in which God had placed him and should
restrain his worldly activity within the limits imposed by his estab-
lished station in life."'" Luther arrived at this judgment through
his reliance on St. Paul, who counseled indifference to worldly
change of status because of his intense eschatological anticipa-
tion and insistence on absolute obedience to God, which entails
the acceptance of things as they are, at least of the socio-eco-
nomic things. 4
Weber saw a dramatic shift in the concept of calling with
Calvin. Calvinism, with its difficult doctrine of double predesti-
nation, imparts an urgency and salience to worldly activity that is
lacking in both Catholicism and Lutheranism. Not knowing
whether one is among the predestined elect or the predestined
10. Id. at 81.
11. Id.
12. MAX WEBER, The Social Psychology of the World Religions, in FROM MAX
WEBER, supra note 8, at 295-96. In Politics as a Vocation, Weber also distin-
guishes between charisma, tradition, and law as modes of authority. WEBER,
Politics as a Vocation, supra note 8, at 78-79.
13. WEBER, supra note 9, at 85.
14. Weber was highly critical of Lutheranism, especially in its Prussian
state-supported contemporary incarnation. He saw Lutheran fatalism as a prin-
ciple cause for the political passivity and immaturity of the German middle
class. See LIEBERSOHN, supra note 6, at 95.
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damned, one can glean a sign from the intensity of one's own
activity: the more disciplined, systematic and intense, the better.
"Waste of time is thus the first and in principle the deadliest of
sins. The span of human life is infinitely short and precious to
make sure of one's own election."' 5 For Luther, calling implied
resignation to one's worldly fate-acceptance of one's social role
and its requisite responsibilities. For Calvin, calling implied the
active choice of productive effort. Even the wealthy should work.
For everyone without exception God's Providence has pre-
pared a calling, which he should profess and in which he
should labour. And this calling is not, as it was for the
Lutheran, a fate to which he must submit and which he
must make the best of, but God's commandment to the
individual to work for the divine glory.
16
To Calvin, the conscientiousness with which a man pursues
his calling provides evidence of his state of grace. Calling implies
a methodical, worldly asceticism. Far from mere resignation to
fate, it is chosen, enacted, affirmed. Its keynote is responsibil-
ity-the prudent care for this world. This sober worldliness is
very much at the heart of Weber's concept of political morality.
To get there, however, requires one more step.
At the end of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,
Weber writes darkly of the tragic dimension of modernity, the
world of the "iron cage." Modern capitalism did not arise
because of Reformed Protestant ideas, but those ideas, in concert
with other historical and economic currents, helped to generate
and institutionalize it. "Puritan worldly asceticism" is one of its
essential elements. But the religious basis of the modern order
has long been forgotten and "victorious capitalism, since it [now]
rests on mechanical foundations, needs its support no longer."'
17
The concept of a calling in modernity has been emptied of con-
tent. It is as if Luther has taken his revenge, and resignation to
fate must again prevail: "The Puritan wanted to work in a calling;
we are forced to do so."' 8 Bureaucratized, machine-like society
compels its denizens with irresistible force to labor and live in
jobs and roles that have no spiritual significance, to be
"[s]pecialists without spirit, sensualists without heart."' 9 The
only hope that Weber held out for culture as a whole is for a new
eruption of charisma: new prophets may arise, filling the world
15. WEBER, supra note 9, at 157.
16. Id. at 160.
17. Id. at 181-82.
18. Id. at 181.
19. Id. at 182.
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again with enchantment and spirit. In the interim, the individual
must comport himself with tragic dignity, eschewing all enthusi-
asms and illusions, bearing responsibility for our worldly condi-
tion with probity. And then a more proximate glimmer of hope:
individual accomplishment within a calling can express at least a
localized charisma. The individual can achieve a heroic integra-
tion of personality (Pers6nlichkeit) that transcends the prison of
the iron cage.
In Politics as a Vocation, Weber filled out the moral program
for the achievement of Persdnlichkeit by the principal actor in the
history of our time, the politician. He thus redeemed the con-
cept of calling from the evisceration of meaning it suffers at the
end of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. He articu-
lated a normative political ethics, which restores content to the
concept of a calling.
"Politics," Weber remarked with a characteristic flash of
color, "is a strong and slow boring of hard boards. It takes both
passion and perspective. "20 Negotiating the balance between
passion and perspective, the inner vibrancy of the calling for
politics and the prudence and dignity of effectuating it through
the exercise of power, is the problem of Weber's ethics. Politics
is always about power, the domination of men by men through
the means of violence over which the modern state has a monop-
oly. But politics ought never to be about mere power politics-
the exercise of power for morally unworthy reasons.21 There is
an ethic that ought to govern the exercise of power.22 Crucially,
however, this ethic is different from those ethics that ought to
prevail in other departments of life, such as "the relations to
one's wife, to the greengrocer, the son, the competitor, the
friend, the defendant."23 Weber is a moral pluralist, in a quali-
fied sense. The ethics of responsibility appropriate to power can-
not be translated wholly and entirely into other social spheres,
such as familial or friendship relations. Attempts to import the
language or normative judgment of religious ethics, for example,
into politics are pernicious. The purity and absolutism of the Ser-
mon on the Mount, if it is not to be debased, can have no home in
a modern politics. Weber would have no truck with Niebuhrian
Christian realism. To take Jesus' ethics seriously is an all or noth-
ing at all, consequences-be-damned matter.
20. WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, supra note 8, at 128.
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'[T] urn the other cheek': This command is unconditional
and does not question the source of the other's authority
to strike. Except for a saint it is an ethic of indignity. This
is it: one must be saintly in everything; at least in intention,
one must live like Jesus, the apostles, St. Francis, and their
like. Then this ethic makes sense and expresses a kind of
dignity; otherwise it does not. For if it is said, in line with
the acosmic ethic of love, 'Resist not him that is evil with
force,' for the politician the reverse proposition holds,
'thou shalt resist evil by force,' or else you are responsible
for the evil winning out.2 4
What, then, are the moral features of the political ethics of
responsibility? The politician must have passion (Leidenschaft), a
feeling of responsibility (Verantwortungsgefiihl), and a sense of
proportion (Augenma3). Passion connotes a deep source of
energy and commitment, rather than a superficial craving for
experience or excitement. "Politics is made with the head, not
with other parts of the body or soul. And yet devotion to politics,
if it is not to be frivolous intellectual play but rather genuinely
human conduct, can be born and nourished from passion
alone. '2 5 By passion, however, Weber intended a disciplined and
detached devotion. The passionate soul-here a Platonic ele-
ment-requires a "firm taming,"26 a "habituation to detachment
in every sense of the word. ' 27 The sin of vanity, of pursuing
power for "personal self-intoxication, instead of exclusively enter-
ing the service of 'the cause ' '28 is one of the primal sins of polit-
ics. The politician must be passionate and detached; "[h]ence
his distance to things and men. 'Lack of distance' per se is one of
the deadly sins of every politician. ' 29 Weber refers to this canal-
ized passion as matter-of-factness (Sachlichkeit) or objectivity.3"
24. Id. at 119-20.
25. WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, supra note 8, at 115.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 116.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 115.
30. In his discussion of appropriate political attitudes toward the German
defeat in the just concluded Great War, he condemns the efforts of the Allies to
ascribe guilt to the Germans or righteousness to themselves as morally inappro-
priate for politicians. The correct political attitude is: "We lost the war. You
have won it. That is now all over. Now let us discuss what conclusions must be
drawn according to the objective interests that came into play and what is the
nlain thing in view of the responsibility towards the future." WEBER, Politics as a
Vocation, supra note 8, at 118. Earlier, he had likened such moralizing to a man
who falls in love with another woman and leaves his partner. Rather than just
accept the Sachlichkeit of the situation, the man insists on rationalizing it to him-
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Passion for a cause, both disciplined and detached, is indica-
tive of the calling for politics, in the higher sense, and separates
the one who lives off politics from the one who lives for it. The
display of passion and the inference of a calling convey charisma,
establishing or enhancing the authority of the politician in the
eyes of his followers. As we enter into the connection between
passion, calling, and charisma, however, we inevitably raise, once
again, the question of religion and religious ethics in relation to
politics and political ethics. I mentioned previously that Weber
was a qualified moral pluralist. By this I mean that, despite his
categorical opposition to an alleged political ethics of responsi-
bility and a religious "absolute ethic" or "ethic of ultimate ends,"
Weber cannot dispense with a religious dimension to politics and
political ethics. (Religious and political ethics cannot be fully
segregated into plural moral universes. Hence, Weber's is a qual-
ified pluralism.) If the work of a politician is to have "inner
strength," then his politics must serve a cause and " [e]xactly what
the cause, in the service of which the politician strives for power
and uses power, looks like is a matter of faith."3 His faith may
lead him to serve "national, humanitarian, social, ethical, cul-
tural, worldly, or religious ends,"32 but "some kind of faith must
always exist."33
There appears to be no ultimate standpoint, no position of
natural right, for example, from which to decide what cause to
serve. "Here, to be sure, ultimate Weltanschauungen clash, world
views among which in the end one has to make a choice."3 4
Weber does not resolve this problem on the level of theory: we
experience the irrationality of the world; we experience the trag-
edy of political action in history. Short of a new revelation that
compels our assent, we are left with ignorance of our ultimate
bearings. But he does resolve the clash of worldviews, of gods
and demons, in a practical way, that is, as a matter of political
ethics. First, political ethics imposes a negative limit: salvation
and utopia are excluded from politics. This narrows the range of
worldviews from which one might choose. Weber is categorical:
He who seeks the salvation of the soul, of his own and of
others, should not seek it along the avenue of politics, for
the quite different tasks of politics can only be solved by
violence. The genius or demon of politics lives in an inner
self-the first woman was not worthy of his love, or she has disappointed him,
etc. Weber finds the refusal to accept unvarnished reality cowardly.





288 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 20
tension with the god of love, as well as with the Christian
God as expressed by the church.
This opposition is, of course, fundamental to the Christian-
ity of Augustine, but for Weber, living without Augustine's cer-
tainties, the opposition cannot be resolved by subordinating
politics to the church. The two are equal and competitive.
Nonetheless, in a practical way, he stands with Machiavelli, who
in his History of Florence, "has one of his heroes praise those citi-
zens who deemed the greatness of their native city higher than
the salvation of their souls."3 6 Politics is defined by its means
(i.e., the use of compelling force), and not by its ends. To be
busy with these means limits the range of ends that can be real-
ized. Pursuing ends, however well intentioned, which are inap-
propriate to the means of politics will damage the ends and
discredit them for generations. The politician, for whom passion
must always be paired with responsibility for consequences, will
lose both his ideals and his own soul if he sins against the realism
that the responsible exercise of power requires. "[W] hat is deci-
sive is the trained relentlessness in viewing the realities of life,
and the ability to face such realities and to measure up to them
inwardly."'7
The relative reduction of worldviews that can be pursued by
means of politics is a substantive limitation on political action.
Weber does not necessarily advocate a prudent minimalism-in
his own politics he sometimes favored bold state action, but
always for the sake of plausible political ends, and through the
use of empirically effective political means. Purist ideologies,
such as pacifism or utopian socialism, fail such a test. The sec-
ond resolution of the problem of moral incommensurability is
more a matter of method than of substance. As we have seen,
Weber argues for a consequentialist ethic: an ethic of responsibil-
ity, over what, from a political vantage point, can only appear
reckless; that is, an ethic of ultimate ends. The practitioner of
responsibility knows that all choices are, in a sense, bad. Every-
thing involves a trade-off; every trade-off involves a loss. To deny
35. Id. at 126. One must raise a question about the sharpness of the
dichotomy that Weber maintains between a religious ethic, such as the Sermon
on the Mount, and a political ethic. From the point of view of the Hebrew
Bible and the rabbinic tradition there is much more bridging between Gesin-
nung and Verantwortung than Weber would allow for. In America, where a
Judaic sensibility has given the "Judeo" side of the Judeo-Christian ethic more
than a politically correct passing mention, the dichotomy appears less plausible
than in a German environment with lingering traces of Lutheran pietism.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 126-27.
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this is to evince a "shoddy and superficially bias6 attitude towards
the meaning of human conduct; and it has no relation whatso-
ever to the knowledge of tragedy with which all action, but espe-
cially political action, is truly interwoven.""8 The politician who
is true to his calling "is aware of a responsibility for the conse-
quences of his conduct and really feels such responsibility with
heart and soul. He then acts by following an ethic of responsibil-
ity and somewhere he reaches the point where he says: "'Here I
stand; I can do no other."' 39 Thus, the ethic of responsibility is,
in the end, not alien to the purest religious convictions, such as
those exemplified by Luther's "Ich kann nicht anders, hier stehe
ich!" The politician who has a calling for politics has made a
choice with his whole soul to live in disciplined fidelity to an
ethic of responsibility. That ethic, although its metier is negotia-
tion, adjustment, and compromise, has come to acquire an abso-
lute and sacred worth in his moral economy. It is taken with the
same seriousness as the saint takes his path of uncompromising
purity.
Weber's reconstitution of political calling in a religious
mode suggests another implication. The politician who has
responsibility for political judgment and decision must also live
with himself when he is, literally and metaphorically, out of
office. Decisions rest on the conscience, and nothing in Weber's
writings suggests an amoral Machiavellianism, where all political
decisions can be excused or justified by appeal to raison d'etat.
His moral pluralism is, as discussed, a qualified one. The ethics
by which we live in private life and the decisions we have to make
in public life both pull in different directions and interpenetrate.
This is not to say that all political decisions can be brought
before the bar of non-political ethics and condemned. Rather,
we must observe, with sobriety and awe, the sublime tension
between the moral frameworks. The mature man (ein reifer
Mensch) must struggle to contain the tension between the
frameworks in an inner unity of soul in the achievement of
Persdnlichkeit.
And every one of us who is not spiritually dead must realize
the possibility of finding himself at some time in that posi-
tion. In so far as this is true, an ethic of ultimate ends and
an ethic of responsibility are not absolute contrasts but
rather supplements, which only in unison constitute a gen-
uine man-a man who can have the "calling for politics."
4 °
38. Id. at 117.
39. Id. at 127 (quotation omitted).
40. Id.
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Abraham Lincoln inarguably had a calling for politics in
both the ordinary sense of wishing to make his living from polit-
ics and in the elevated sense of a man of destiny whose task was
to serve his nation in its most critical hour through politics. As
much as Lincoln was devoted to the natural right proposition
that "all men are created equal," he was also committed to politi-
cal courses of action through which to effectuate that truth. To
Lincoln, the political evil of disunion was more grievous than the
pure moral evil of slavery. The political cause of the union,
which acquired a mystical sacrality for him, was the highest cause.
As Lincoln wrote in a letter to the New York Tribune during the
war:
My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union,
and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save
the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I
could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I
could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone I
would also do that.
4 1
Lincoln believed strongly in the evil of slavery, but he drew a
quite Weberian distinction between moral evil and political evil.
In his 1854 speech at Peoria against the Kansas-Nebraska Act,
which overturned the Missouri Compromise and brought slavery
into the western territories, Lincoln's arguments, although sup-
ported by moral conviction, were essentially political and eco-
nomic. Slavery discourages the industry and productivity of the
majority, which alone can lead to economic growth.42 Self-gov-
ernment is a fundamental principle among us, but "no man is
good enough to govern another man, without that other's con-
sent."'43 (He appealed here, not to Almighty God or to natural
right, but to the Declaration of Independence, which is the rele-
vant political foundation and the "sheet anchor of American
republicanism."). 44 The spirit of compromise is necessary for
democratic government: if the Missouri Compromise were over-
turned, how would factions be able to reach compromises in the
future?45 Lincoln also addressed the discomfort of fellow Whigs,
41. MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE LAST BEST HOPE OF EARTH: ABRAHAM LIN-
COLN AND THE PROMISE OF AMERICA 111 (1993).
42. See 1 THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 518 (David A. Hollinger
& Charles Capper eds., 2001).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 520.
The spirit of mutual concession-that spirit which first gave us the
constitution, and which has thrice saved the Union-we shall have
strangled and cast from us forever . . .But restore the compromise,
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who wanted to restore the Compromise but felt ill at ease in
aligning themselves with the abolitionists. With exemplary politi-
cal morality, he counseled them to "[s]tand with anybody that
stands right. Stand with him while he is right and part with him
when he goes wrong. Stand with the abolitionist in restoring the
Missouri Compromise; and stand against him when he attempts
to repeal the fugitive slave law."'4 6 Such examples of balancing
underlying religious and moral conviction with a political ethic
could be multiplied, right up to the language and timing of the
Emancipation Proclamation. Lincoln's ethic of political respon-
sibility led Frederick Douglass to remark, "Viewed from the genu-
ine abolition ground, Mr. Lincoln seemed tardy, cold, dull, and
indifferent; but measuring him by the sentiment of his country, a
sentiment he was bound as a statesman to consult, he was swift,
zealous, radical, and determined."4 7
Lincoln not only subordinated the religious-moral impera-
tive of eradicating slavery to his political cause of preserving the
Union, but he also embodied, in a fully tragic vision, the compet-
ing gods and demons of which Weber wrote. In his Second Inau-
gural Address, he asserted both the rightness of the Union's
cause and the judgment of God against her:
Both [sides] read the same Bible, and pray to the same
God; and each invokes His aid against the other. It may
seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's
assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other
men's faces; but let us judge not that we be not judged.
The prayers of both could not be answered; that of neither
has been answered fully. The Almighty has His own pur-
poses. "Woe unto the world because of offences! for it
must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by
whom the offence cometh!" If we shall suppose that Amer-
ican Slavery is one of those offences which, in the provi-
dence of God, must needs come, but which, having
continued through His appointed time, He now wills to
remove, and that He gives to both North and South, this
terrible war, as the woe due to those by whom the offence
came, shall we discern therein any departure from those
and what then? We thereby restore the national faith, the national
confidence, the national feeling of brotherhood. We thereby reinstate
the spirit of concession and compromise-that spirit which has never
failed us in past perils, and which may be safely trusted for all the
future.
Id.
46. Id. at 520-21.
47. NEELY, supra note 41, at 97.
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divine attributes which the believers in a Living God always
ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope-fervenly do we
pray-that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass
away. Yet, if God wills that it continue, until all the wealth
piled by the bond-man's two hundred and fifty years of
unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of
blood drawn with the lash, shall be paid by another drawn
with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still
it must be said "the judgments of the Lord, are true and
righteous altogether."
4 8
Lincoln was not, of course, a moral relativist. He believed in
God-not in resolute, but irrational, commitment. (Although
Weber did not believe in God, he was no relativist either.
Strauss' attempt to portray him as a bridge between Nietzsche
and Heidegger violates one of Strauss' own key principles: to
understand a writer as he understood himself.) In his Second
Inaugural Address, Lincoln expressed both the necessity and the
tragedy of political action. The cause of the North is just, but the
North is also unjust; the whole nation bears the guilt of centuries
of slavery. Both sides read the same Bible and prayed to the
same God yet have reached opposite conclusions about what He
intends. Even though the bloodshed may yet last generations,
God is utterly just and neither side has a right to complain.
God's justice, different from and superior to man's, makes rela-
tive the justice we effectuate through politics. Nonetheless, our
justice is not divorced from His. There is, however, enough
space between them so that we can never wrap our deeds in the
cloak of His truth. Although Lincoln's idiom is quite different
from Weber's, the tragic sense of the irreconcilability of different
moral scales is similar. Both Lincoln and Weber's politician with
a calling assume responsibility for the world without illusion or
vanity.
Given the enormity of slavery's evil, Lincoln's prudential and
political approach toward containing and ending it does not
seem like an admirable policy today. However, it is unfair to
judge the moral-political actors of the past solely by the moral
clarities of the present. Indeed, they might not have become
clear were it not for the struggle of those whom we now presume
to judge. A better yardstick is whether those actors were true to
an ethic of political responsibility: whether they judged compet-
ing claims and policies by rational and immanent standards of
success as well as by adherence to foundational constitutional
48. 1 THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL TRADITION, supra note 42, at 528-29.
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principles, and whether they followed what the Declaration of
Independence called the dictates of prudence. 9
A vision of political responsibility that comprehends both
empirical consequences and fidelity to fundamental norms is
much needed in the contemporary American polity. The mor-
ally conflicted choices we face on such issues as expansion of
stem cell research, the status of Roe v. Wade,"° the definition of
marriage, or a foreign policy promoting the democratization of
foreign states do not lend themselves to simplistic reduction.
Nonetheless, partisans of the secular left or of the religious right
fool themselves into thinking that such issues can be decided
along a single axis ofjudgment, whether it be adjudicating rights
claims, maximizing benefits, or promoting fidelity to a presump-
tive biblical morality. To take Weber seriously is to cast doubt on
the claim that religiously informed ethics can be translated sub-
stantially into politics or policy. Doing so would also cast doubt
on the claim that politics can or should be "liberated" or disen-
tangled from religion. It has never been clear, in the American
experience, where the sacred work ends and the profane begins.
Yet within this field of conflicting forces, Weberian attention to
the means and ends proper to politics could yet dispel some of
the moral confusion and combativeness of our culture wars, with-
out, as the example of Lincoln shows, emptying our public life of
moral principle.
49. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Prudence,
indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed
for light and transient causes; ..
50. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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